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As part of an initiative to move towards greater financial stability in the Asian region, a Regional Monetary Unit is
being proposed for the ASEAN+3 nations. These include China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand. Other countries can be added in the future. Professors Hwee Kwan Chow, Peter N. Kriz,
Roberto S. Mariano and Augustine H. H. Tan, from the School of Economics at Singapore Management University,
offer their views on the need for a RMU, what its benefits are and how it would work. Their views are summarized
below.
At this point in time, a Regional Monetary Unit (RMU) would have two primary purposes. One would establish capital
markets based on regional currencies. It would allow recycling of savings through the region.  The first step in this
direction would be to establish a bond market based on the RMU. The goal would be to have a range of maturities
and liquid markets along the yield curve.
The second would be the surveillance of key macroeconomic variables of member nations relating to exchange
rates. It includes trade balances, balance of payments, growth rate, unemployment rates, inflation rates and budget
deficits or surpluses. Surveillance also includes monitoring the monetary and fiscal policies affecting these
variables. It is needed for a proper weighing scheme for currencies in the RMU basket.
European Precedent
The precedent is the European customs union which gave rise to the European Monetary System (EMS) and its
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Together, they defined a system and management of exchange rate bands among
participating members. These institutional arrangements eventually led to the economic union of member countries
and a common currency, the euro. The euro, of course, has proven to be a remarkable success and, in part, has
taken on a role as an alternative to the US dollar as a world currency.
To adopt a similar path in Asia, the first step would be to establish a Regional Monetary Unit (RMU). The RMU would
be an accounting and monetary unit made up of currencies of the member countries. As it became more widely
accepted, RMU-denominated instruments would experience an increase in liquidity for different maturities along their
yield curves. With active trading in various instruments and maturities, the RMU would have the potential to evolve
into a type of currency used in trade.
According to co-author Augustine Tan, “If Asian economic integration is to develop serious momentum, it would need
visionaries like Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, the founding fathers of the EU, who sought lasting peace and
friendship among the European nations via political and economic cooperation.”
Increased adoption of the RMU may lead central banks towards a progressively managed exchange rate system
among member countries. A regional exchange rate policy would therefore necessarily entail a loss of monetary
sovereignty. In such a managed regional arrangement, even if the RMU becomes fixed within ASEAN+3, the RMU
itself would not necessarily be fixed externally. It could conceivably float relative to the US dollar, the euro and
other world currencies. The effect would be to make currencies in the RMU basket variable as well.
A fluctuating RMU might pose a problem for rigid or pegged currencies, such as the Chinese yuan and the Hong Kong
dollar, as it could result in two prices for those currencies.  One would be the official (controlled or pegged)
exchange rate. The other would be the value of the currency’s component in the floating RMU basket. The problem
is not without precedent. Germany went through a similar dual price system with the mark on its road to the
adoption of the euro. 
Conceptual Framework
The approach is to consider RMU market development according to three forms of monetary policy commitment to
the RMU: weak, strong and institutional. Weak form ranges from creation of the RMU bond markets to the
management and build-out of the markets. It establishes the rules for market entry and exit as well as incentives for
market participants. Strong form corresponds to a commitment to the future value of the RMU. It focuses on the
stability of RMU markets and the valuation accorded to the RMU. It also involves the surveillance of monetary and
fiscal policies of member countries and the technical structure of the RMU. These factors will help determine how the
RMU should trade, and how sovereign monetary policy should be designed in the context of informal policy
cooperation.
Institutional form develops linkages between the movement of the RMU and component currencies. This form of
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commitment requires that the RMU would reflect a regional monetary policy, and the role that the RMU would play in
a regional monetary arrangement, such as an Asian Bretton Woods system, an Asian Monetary System or Asian
Monetary Union.
The current challenges facing Asian policymakers involve the design, implementation, and expansion of RMU markets.
Successful launch and initial growth of RMU markets will depend crucially on the sequential realisation of the four
phases of weak-form monetary policy commitment to the RMU.
In Phase I, policymakers would end preferential treatment of sovereign currencies. To do so, of course, requires
considerable political commitment. It would also include making the RMU an official currency and promoting its use in
regional government transactions. This would send a powerful signal to the private sector and encourage its use
there. Phase I also requires convertibility of participating currencies to the RMU, particularly the Chinese yuan and
Vietnamese dong. Co-author Peter Kriz comments, “Given the large weight that will be accorded to China in any
Asian basket arrangement, convertibility of the yuan to the RMU would profoundly expand the scope and potential of
the RMU market.”
In Phase II, member countries would seek to grow markets for private RMU instruments. Their actions should include
making the RMU a parallel currency with rights and legal tender. RMU products should also be exempt from capital
controls. This assistance is necessary to overcome preference for sovereign market currencies and the
predominance of the US dollar in trade. To assure a seamless movement of capital between the RMU and domestic
currencies, Phase II will necessarily harmonise accounting and tax systems including the elimination of tax
differentials. Benefits of lower tax rates in some member countries serve as a disincentive to participate in the RMU.
Phase II will also require policymakers to invest in payment and settlement systems, tax and accounting systems,
education and training as well as marketing campaigns. The RMU also needs benchmark issuances such as 5, 10 and
30-year treasury notes and bonds. This array will provide necessary anchors for the RMU yield curve. Finally, use of
the RMU in international reserves will increase the public commitment and profile of the RMU. 
In Phase III, member policymakers will accelerate the deepening of markets for RMU-based instruments. In particular,
they will need to focus on the short-end of the yield curve such as RMU commercial paper. It would also involve
encouraging participation of traders, risk managers and arbitrageurs who could assist in the development of
secondary and derivative markets. The liquidity and active participation in these markets is crucial to their success. 
In Phase IV, the RMU would set credible expectations for the RMU's role in monetary policy cooperation. If regional
policymakers intend that RMU markets grow and deepen, they will need to clearly communicate the path going
forward, whether the future is the maintenance of the status quo following Phase III, informal monetary cooperation,
formal monetary coordination, or monetary union. The clarity of these communiqués and supporting policy actions
will help establish the proper expectations in the private markets for RMU products.
Clearly the success of the RMU will depend largely on the exercise of political will. Commenting on the importance of
political support, Kriz emphasises, “Maintaining the integrity of the RMU in a region with an incredible range of
political regimes and political history will provide immeasurable credibility to the RMU as a truly regional unit.”
Commitment to Cooperation
To accelerate the development of RMU markets, it will be important for member countries to commit to a path of
regional monetary policy cooperation. This would necessarily involve monetary and fiscal surveillance, the design of
and commitment to an independent RMU, region-wide reforms of domestic institutions and policies, and political
support for the viability of private RMU instruments. Key macroeconomic policy indicators should be closely
watched. For example, there should be rules or at least guidelines with regard to acceptable budget deficits, money
supply growth and inflation rates.
It is also necessary to provide divergence indicators. These will measure differences between monetary and fiscal
policy goals set for countries and the measures they achieve. Divergence indicators would also provide information
about how the RMU will behave under speculative pressure.  
For the RMU to establish itself as a monetary unit for ASEAN+3, it must maintain its independence. It should not
become a shadow of a dominant anchor currency in Asia. It should not be seen as being manipulated for national
objectives. The independence of the RMU would encourage market activity that would price in both expectations of
it becoming an anchor to an Asian Monetary System, and the possibility of it becoming a single currency for
ASEAN+3. 
To realize the potential of strong form commitment, it will be necessary to promote institutional and policy reforms in
each country. Trade barriers between countries must also be reduced. Central bank independence should be
increased and there should be a gradual privatisation of state-owned banks and companies. Where required,
bankruptcy laws should be reformed and court systems streamlined to improve the swiftness of judicial remedies in
business dealings.
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Trade and financial integration must be accelerated along with free trade. The European experience shows that
countries with chronically weak currencies were able to benefit greatly from technical assistance and institutional
reforms associated with the development of ECU markets. 
According to Kriz, similar ASEAN countries will also benefit from the mobility of RMU-denominated capital. “Economies
with fragile banking systems would face less risk and currency mismatch of assets and liabilities if capital mobility is
permitted between sovereign currencies and the RMU,” he says. Leadership from governments is needed to establish
the private sector confidence required to assure the RMU’s success. It would also allow determination of the extent
to which the RMU can trade as a de facto regional currency. 
Currency Basket for the RMU
The study recommends including the Japanese yen in the currency basket. It also recommends including the Chinese
yuan, although there are potential problems with the non-convertibility of the yuan. It is desirable to have exception
to all capital controls for RMU transactions. It is recommended that the currencies included have similar trade flows. 
The RMU could follow the construction of the ECU within the EMS. As such, the RMU should be a weighted average
of all thirteen ASEAN+3 currencies. Weights are calculated based on the following considerations: trade volume,
nominal GDP, GDP measured at PPP, international reserves, financial openness and inflation (as measured by GDP
deflators).
There is an asymmetry between the weightings of the ASEAN nations and the +3 countries of China, Japan and
Korea. Weighting schemes would assign combined weights of the “plus three” countries at between 58 per cent and
over 70 per cent.  Replacing GDP with PPP-based GDP in the weight computations reduces the weights of China,
Japan and Korea. This may be more politically tenable and would encourage the smaller ASEAN countries to use the
RMU as an alternative tool for monitoring foreign market conditions. The system would be open-ended to include new
countries as their trading structure evolves. An example is the Vietnamese dong. It is not included because it has
missing values in the time series but can likely be included in the future.
Over time, the currencies in the basket appreciate or depreciate relative to one another. To avoid a situation where
a currency becomes significantly over (under) represented as it appreciates (depreciates) over time, it is necessary
to establish a system for regularly revising the composition of the basket. For instance, the ECU was revised three
times: in March 1979, September 1984 and December 1994. No further re-weighting of the ECU basket was carried
out after 1994, in preparation of the introduction of the single currency, the euro, in 1999.
For the RMU, the authors propose that revisions take place every three years and that component currencies with
weights exceeding 30 per cent of the basket be monitored very closely. While politically attractive, ceilings on
weights may be self-defeating from the perspective of developing healthy RMU markets.  
The ERM crisis of 1992-93 should remind Asia that any regional monetary arrangement requires deep and ongoing
commitment to the political ideals behind regional monetary coordination. Should Asia decide upon formal monetary
coordination, it should commit to an arrangement that makes both economic and political sense. Failure to do so
risks the possibility of another currency and financial crisis. For the RMU, attacks on currencies by speculators can
be reduced by using wider bans. The authors suggest plus or minus 10 per cent. It is also possible to have various
band widths, with narrower bands for the core countries and wider ones for less financially developed nations.
The credibility of an ERM system depends largely on regional cooperation on monetary policy of ASEAN+3 countries.
The ERM parity grid effectively anchored on the German mark rendering a minor role to the ECU. Given the economic
and political asymmetry among its likely participants, an Asian monetary system will probably be forced to rely on an
anchor currency or currencies to provide a target for calibrating regional monetary policy. 
 (#top)
 (#top)
